Wells Fargo Asset Cap Removal: How the Fed’s 2025 Decision Unlocks a 15%+ Upside Path Through 2026

For seven years, Wells Fargo & Company (NYSE: WFC) operated under one of the most unusual penalties in modern banking history: a hard ceiling on the size of its balance sheet. The Federal Reserve’s 2018 consent order, imposed after the bank’s fake-accounts scandal, froze total assets near $1.95 trillion and forced management to grow earnings the hard way — by squeezing fees out of existing customers, exiting marginal businesses, and returning capital aggressively to shareholders. That era ended in the second quarter of 2025, when the Fed formally lifted the asset cap. Now, a year later, investors finally have a clean run of quarterly data showing what an unconstrained Wells Fargo actually looks like — and the early results suggest the market is still meaningfully undervaluing the structural shift.

At $83.73 per share as of June 13, 2026, WFC trades at just 10.6 times forward earnings of $7.90, a 25%+ discount to JPMorgan Chase despite finally being free to compete for balance sheet growth. The consensus Wall Street price target sits at $96.80, implying roughly 15.6% upside before any dividend, and a base-case scenario built on the bank’s own 17–18% return on tangible common equity (ROTCE) target suggests fair value closer to $98–$102. This piece walks through why the asset cap removal is more than a one-time catalyst, why the Q1 2026 net interest margin scare was misread, and where the realistic risk-reward sits today.

Three things you need to know before reading further. First, Wells Fargo’s loan book crossed $1 trillion for the first time since early 2020 in Q1 2026, with average loans up 10% year over year — a number that was literally impossible to produce before mid-2025 under the asset cap. Second, the new 17–18% ROTCE target raised by CEO Charlie Scharf in early 2026 is not a wish; it is the floor of what management believes is achievable now that capital can be deployed into commercial and industrial lending again. Third, the recent selloff that pushed the stock from a 52-week high of $97.76 down to the low-$80s was driven by NIM compression that is largely a deposit-cost lag issue, not a structural problem with the loan book. This article will work through company structure, the U.S. money-center bank competitive landscape, the four pillars of the bank’s economic moat, three years of financial trends, valuation under three scenarios, key risks, and a concrete exit plan for new positions.

1. Company Overview

Wells Fargo & Company is one of the four U.S. money-center banks — alongside JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Citigroup — but its business mix tilts heaviest toward domestic consumer and commercial lending. The bank serves roughly one in three U.S. households, operates more than 4,000 branches concentrated in the western and southern United States, and manages over $2 trillion in client assets across its wealth platform. Unlike JPMorgan or Citigroup, Wells Fargo earns the overwhelming majority of its revenue from U.S. operations, which historically has been both a strength (insulation from emerging-market shocks) and a weakness (no offset when the U.S. economy slows).

The company reports through four operating segments, each with materially different growth profiles, return characteristics, and sensitivities to the asset cap removal.

Revenue mix by segment (Q4 2025 reported basis):



SegmentQ4 2025 RevenueYoY ChangeReturn on Allocated CapitalAsset-Cap Sensitivity
Consumer Banking and Lending$9.6 billion+7%Mid-teensMedium
Commercial Banking$3.1 billion–3%16.5%High
Corporate and Investment Banking~$4.8 billion (est.)–3%13.8%Highest
Wealth and Investment Management~$4.0 billion (est.)+10%High (capital-light)Low

Consumer Banking and Lending is the historical anchor — credit cards, auto loans, residential mortgages, and small business deposits. The +7% revenue growth in Q4 2025 was driven by the card franchise, which Wells Fargo has aggressively rebuilt over the past three years through new co-branded products and reward partnerships. Commercial Banking and Corporate & Investment Banking together comprise the engine room of the asset cap thaw: commercial and industrial loans, asset-backed lending, treasury services, and capital markets activity. The fact that both segments still posted year-over-year revenue declines in Q4 2025 — despite the asset cap being lifted in Q2 — is exactly why this story has more runway than the share price reflects. Management did not flip a switch on lending the day the cap came off; the redeployment of capacity into productive loans is a multi-quarter and multi-year process. Wealth and Investment Management, with its +10% revenue growth, is the diamond hidden in plain sight — capital-light, fee-based, and largely uncorrelated to balance sheet growth.

The ownership structure is dominated by passive index funds and large active asset managers. Berkshire Hathaway, once the largest single holder, exited the position progressively after 2017 and is no longer a material shareholder. Insider ownership is small in absolute terms but has shown net buying activity through the share price weakness of April–May 2026, a signal worth taking seriously when management is being asked to defend a multi-year transformation thesis.

2. Industry Analysis

2-1. Market Size and Growth Trajectory

The U.S. banking sector, measured by total commercial bank assets, sits at roughly $24 trillion as of mid-2026. Growth has averaged 5–6% annually over the last decade and is expected to track nominal GDP plus modest market share gains for the largest players. Within that universe, the four money-center banks control approximately 45% of total assets, a concentration ratio that has crept upward steadily since the 2008 financial crisis as regulatory complexity disadvantaged smaller institutions.

What makes the 2026–2028 window particularly interesting is the convergence of three industry trends. First, the Federal Reserve’s gradual easing cycle, with the federal funds rate now sitting in a 3.50%–3.75% range, has begun to stabilize the deposit beta dynamics that crushed net interest margins through 2024. Second, commercial loan demand has reaccelerated from the 2023 lows as corporate capex projects deferred during the rate-hike era come off the shelf. Third, and most importantly for Wells Fargo specifically, the regulatory drawdown — fewer outstanding consent orders, lifted asset cap, and reduced compliance overhead — frees up basis points of operating margin that competitors have already been enjoying for years.

The relevant addressable opportunity for Wells Fargo, narrowly defined, is the gap between its current $1.96 trillion balance sheet and the $2.5–$2.7 trillion it could plausibly carry given its capital base and franchise. Closing even half of that gap over three years at typical net interest spreads would add $4–$5 billion in annual revenue — a 5% incremental revenue tailwind that no peer can replicate because no peer was the one stuck under the cap.

2-2. Structural Growth Drivers

Driver 1: Asset cap removal and the re-leverage cycle. This is the single most underappreciated catalyst in the U.S. large-cap banking sector. From February 2018 through Q2 2025, Wells Fargo could not grow its total assets past the cap of approximately $1.95 trillion no matter what the macro environment did. Every dollar of new loan production had to be funded by either letting another loan roll off, divesting a non-core business, or trimming the securities portfolio. JPMorgan grew assets meaningfully during the same window. Bank of America added hundreds of billions. Wells Fargo stood still — not because management did not want to grow, but because regulators would not let it. The Q1 2026 result of loans crossing $1 trillion is the first concrete data point showing what unconstrained organic growth looks like, and analysts at Piper Sandler have explicitly characterized management’s tone as having shifted from “defense to offense.” The re-leverage cycle, in our view, is a five-to-seven-year tailwind because Wells Fargo will be reclaiming market share that drifted to competitors over nearly a decade. Each quarter of mid-single-digit loan growth compounds — at 5% loan growth annually, the loan book reaches $1.27 trillion by the end of 2030, generating substantial additional net interest income at current spreads.

Driver 2: Commercial and industrial lending normalization. The Q1 2026 earnings call highlighted that commercial and industrial (C&I) loans were the primary driver behind the 11% year-over-year increase in period-end loans. C&I lending is a high-margin, relationship-driven business where Wells Fargo’s existing roster of mid-market and large corporate clients provides a meaningful structural advantage. The bank is a large C&I lender with an established mid-market and large-corporate client base, and the data suggests it is now winning a disproportionate share of new lending mandates as borrowers consolidate banking relationships with the largest, most stable players. Management has signaled that loan growth could exceed the mid-single-digit assumption embedded in full-year 2026 guidance if commercial demand holds — a piece of language Wall Street has tended to ignore but which has historically preceded positive earnings revisions for the bank.

Driver 3: Wealth and Investment Management mix shift. The Wealth segment is growing at 10% with capital-light fee revenue characteristics. As this segment becomes a larger share of total revenue (roughly 18% currently, plausibly 22–24% by 2028), the consolidated return on equity profile of the firm should improve mechanically. Fee-based revenue carries higher margins, requires less regulatory capital, and is significantly less cyclical than net interest income. The growth trajectory is being driven by a combination of market appreciation on existing client assets, advisor productivity gains, and modest net new asset inflows. Investors who anchor on Wells Fargo as a pure-play traditional bank are increasingly mispricing the wealth and capital-light contribution.

2-3. Competitive Landscape



BankMarket CapForward P/EROTCE TargetLoan Growth (Q1 2026 YoY)NIMKey Strength
JPMorgan Chase (JPM)~$730B (est.)~13.5x17%~4%2.71%Diversification, scale
Bank of America (BAC)~$345B (est.)~12.0x13%~2%1.97%Deposit franchise
Wells Fargo (WFC)$256B10.6x17–18%11%2.47%Asset cap thaw, C&I
Citigroup (C)~$135B (est.)~8.5x11%~1%1.85%Global, services
US Bancorp (USB)~$80B (est.)~9.5x14%~3%2.65%Regional efficiency

The takeaway from this table is stark. Wells Fargo trades at a meaningful discount to JPMorgan and Bank of America despite having the highest reported loan growth in the peer set, a ROTCE target tied with JPMorgan’s, and a net interest margin sitting in the middle of the range. The market is essentially pricing WFC as if the Q1 2026 NIM compression is a structural problem rather than a deposit-cost lag that will normalize as the Fed’s easing cycle works through the funding stack. Bank of America trades at a higher multiple despite slower loan growth and a lower ROTCE target. Citigroup is cheaper but has structurally weaker returns and ongoing strategic restructuring overhang. The closest valuation peer in the United States is US Bancorp, which has historically traded at a higher multiple than Wells Fargo and does not have the asset cap re-rating optionality on its side.

The competitive position Wells Fargo holds is best understood as “a top-tier U.S. domestic bank with a uniquely constrained recent history, now unleashed.” That description did not apply during the 2018–2025 period. It applies now, and the implications for earnings power compound over multiple years.

3. Economic Moat Analysis

Moat Type 1: Switching Costs and Deposit Franchise

Wells Fargo’s deposit franchise is the foundation of its earnings power and the slowest-melting asset on its balance sheet. The bank holds approximately $1.4 trillion in deposits across roughly 70 million customer relationships, with the vast majority sitting in everyday checking and savings accounts. Switching banks is genuinely painful — direct deposits, autopay arrangements, business cash management workflows, and online bill-payment configurations create high frictional costs for households and small businesses. The result is that even during the regulatory turmoil of 2018–2025, Wells Fargo did not experience significant deposit flight; customers complained, but they largely stayed.

The economic value of this stickiness shows up in funding cost. In Q1 2026, Wells Fargo’s blended deposit cost remained materially below money-market rates available elsewhere, providing a structural spread advantage on every dollar of loans. The “deposit beta” — the percentage of any Fed rate change that flows through to depositors — has historically been lower for Wells Fargo than for online-only banks or smaller regional players, which means rising rates lift net interest income faster than they lift funding costs, and falling rates do not collapse the funding advantage symmetrically.

Concrete evidence of the moat: even after seven years of reputation damage and aggressive deposit competition from fintechs, Wells Fargo’s share of U.S. retail deposits has held remarkably steady in the 10–11% range. That kind of consistency only exists where switching costs are real and behavioral inertia is strong.

Moat Type 2: Cost Advantage Through Scale

The U.S. banking industry has been moving toward a cost structure where the largest players have a permanent advantage that smaller competitors cannot match. Wells Fargo’s technology spend exceeds $10 billion annually — a number that lets the bank deploy AI-driven fraud detection, automated underwriting, and integrated wealth-banking platforms that mid-sized regional banks simply cannot afford. Operating efficiency, measured as the efficiency ratio (noninterest expense divided by total revenue), came in around 67% for full-year 2025, with management guiding to gradual improvement as revenue growth outpaces expense growth in 2026 and 2027. Each one-percentage-point improvement in the efficiency ratio adds roughly $800 million in pre-tax earnings.

Scale also shows up in regulatory compliance. The compliance and risk-management infrastructure required to operate as a globally systemically important bank is fixed cost in nature, and spreading that fixed cost across $2 trillion of assets is materially cheaper per dollar than spreading it across $200 billion at a regional bank. As regulatory complexity has increased post-2008, this scale advantage has widened rather than narrowed.

Moat Type 3: Brand and Franchise Density in Geographic Footprint

Wells Fargo’s branch footprint is dense in the high-growth western and southern United States — California, Texas, Florida, Arizona, the Carolinas, Georgia. These are states where population growth has outpaced the national average for two decades and where small-business formation has been concentrated. The branch network is increasingly being used as a wealth advisor distribution channel rather than purely as a transaction venue, which extends the franchise value rather than diminishing it. Competitors trying to enter these markets de novo would have to spend years and billions of dollars to build comparable density.

Moat Durability Assessment

Will these moats hold through 2030 and beyond? The honest answer is “mostly yes, with one watch item.”

Switching costs and the deposit franchise are durable as long as Wells Fargo does not commit another large compliance failure that destroys customer trust at scale. Management has spent seven years rebuilding the compliance infrastructure and risk culture; another major scandal seems unlikely but cannot be ruled out entirely.

The cost-advantage moat is more durable than it has ever been because regulatory complexity and technology requirements continue to favor the largest players. Mid-sized regional banks are structurally disadvantaged in a way they were not twenty years ago.

The geographic franchise moat is the most durable of the three because retail banking is fundamentally a local-density business and franchise density compounds.

The watch item is the gradual shift of consumer banking activity to fintech-style mobile-only experiences. If a future generation of consumers genuinely views their primary financial relationship as living with a fintech rather than a traditional bank, the deposit moat would erode over a decade-plus horizon. Wells Fargo’s response — heavy investment in mobile experience and AI-driven personal financial management — has been adequate but not category-defining. This is the area to monitor over the next five years.

투자 분석 이미지
Photo by joão vincient lewis on Unsplash

4. Financial Analysis

Multi-Year Revenue and Earnings Trend



MetricFY2022FY2023FY2024FY2025
Total Revenue$82.6 B$82.3 B$83.7 B$83.4 B
Net Income$13.2 B$19.1 B$19.7 B$21.3 B
Diluted EPS$3.14$4.83$5.37$6.26
ROTCE10.0%12.5%13.6%15.0%
Efficiency Ratio~75%~73%~70%~67%

(Revenue and net income from Wells Fargo annual earnings releases; ROTCE and efficiency ratio from company disclosures; the gap between EPS growth and net income growth reflects the impact of the multi-year share buyback program.)

What the table reveals is a quiet but persistent compounding story. Revenue has been roughly flat at the headline level — exactly what the asset cap would predict — but net income has compounded at approximately 17% annually and EPS has compounded at approximately 26% annually over the three-year window, driven by share repurchases, efficiency-ratio improvement, and the operational turnaround. The bank entered 2026 with the highest ROTCE since 2018 and an EPS run rate that finally validates the post-scandal transformation. On a trailing twelve-month basis, EPS now stands at $6.48, and consensus EPS for the next fiscal year sits at $7.90 — implying continued double-digit EPS growth as the asset cap thaw flows through.

Key Operating Metrics

Period-end loans (Q1 2026): Over $1.0 trillion for the first time since early 2020, up 11% year over year
Average deposits: ~$1.40 trillion (steady)
Net interest income (Q1 2026): $12.1 billion (+5.2% YoY)
Net interest margin (Q1 2026): 2.47% (down 20 bps YoY)
Common Equity Tier 1 ratio: ~11.0% (comfortably above regulatory minimum)
Total assets: $1.96 trillion (with room to grow following cap removal)
Shares outstanding: 3.06 billion (down meaningfully from prior years via buybacks)
Return on equity (TTM): 12.07%
Return on assets (TTM): 1.04%

The NIM compression from 2.67% to 2.47% over the year is the single piece of data that caused the spring 2026 selloff. Reading the Q1 2026 transcript carefully, however, makes clear that the compression is driven by deposit mix shift and CD repricing — not by deteriorating asset yields. Net interest income still grew 5.2%, and management’s full-year NII guidance of approximately $50 billion implies continued mid-single-digit NII growth, exactly in line with the asset cap thaw thesis.

Balance Sheet and Capital Return

Wells Fargo holds a substantial cash and liquidity buffer, carries a manageable debt profile commensurate with bank operations, and continues to generate free cash flow that exceeds dividends and buybacks combined. The 2026 capital plan includes meaningful share buybacks and a growing dividend, against a market cap of $256 billion. The implied total shareholder yield is competitive with the yield on long-dated Treasuries while providing equity upside optionality.

The Common Equity Tier 1 ratio of approximately 11% provides cushion for continued buybacks and modest balance sheet expansion without triggering regulatory capacity constraints. There is no scenario in our base case where Wells Fargo needs to issue equity, which historically has been the single most important factor preventing large-cap bank stocks from compounding.

Path of Margin Expansion

The story for 2026 and 2027 is not about heroic revenue growth — it is about modest revenue growth coupled with disciplined expense management driving operating leverage. The full-year 2026 noninterest expense guidance of approximately $55.7 billion against rising revenue produces incremental operating leverage that flows almost entirely to the bottom line. Combined with continued share repurchases, EPS power can reach $8.50–$9.00 by 2027 on consensus-style assumptions and could approach $10 in a more constructive macro scenario.

5. Valuation

The cleanest way to value Wells Fargo is on a forward P/E basis using consensus EPS next year of $7.90, sanity-checked against the bank’s own 17–18% ROTCE medium-term target and the trading multiples of comparable money-center banks. We complement the P/E framework with a price-to-book sanity check, given that bank earnings are inherently volatile and tangible book value is a more stable anchor.

Base Case: Modest Multiple Re-Rating, Earnings Power Recognized

In the base case, Wells Fargo executes on its current trajectory — loan growth in the mid-to-high single digits, NIM stabilization through the second half of 2026, expense discipline, and continued share buybacks. EPS for 2027 reaches roughly $8.50, and the market assigns a 12.0x forward multiple, reflecting the closure of roughly half the discount to JPMorgan’s typical 13–14x multiple. Fair value: 12.0x × $8.50 = $102 per share, implying approximately 22% upside from the current $83.73.

Bull Case: ROTCE Target Achieved, Multiple Closes Fully

In the bull case, Wells Fargo reaches the upper end of its 17–18% ROTCE target by 2027, commercial loan demand exceeds management guidance, and the market re-rates the stock to a multiple in line with JPMorgan at 13.5x. EPS for 2027 reaches $9.00 (above consensus). Fair value: 13.5x × $9.00 = $121 per share, implying approximately 45% upside.

Bear Case: NIM Pressure Persists, Loan Growth Disappoints

In the bear case, deposit costs continue rising faster than asset yields, loan demand softens with the macro economy, and the ROTCE trajectory disappoints. EPS for 2027 stalls at $7.20, and the multiple compresses to 9.5x as the market gives up on the asset cap thesis. Fair value: 9.5x × $7.20 = $68 per share, implying approximately 19% downside.

Price-to-Book Sanity Check

Wells Fargo currently trades at 1.57x book value. At its targeted ROTCE of 17–18%, the appropriate P/B multiple under standard bank valuation frameworks is in the 1.8–2.0x range. Closure of half that gap implies a fair P/B of approximately 1.7x, which on the current book value supports a price in the low-$90s — broadly consistent with our base-case P/E-derived value.

Comparison to Analyst Consensus

The consensus 12-month price target from Wall Street sits at $96.80, implying approximately 15.6% upside from the current price. Our base-case valuation of $102 sits modestly above consensus, primarily because we believe the multiple re-rating story is being underappreciated by the sell side, which is still anchoring on the post-2018 multiple range. We agree with the consensus direction; we are slightly more constructive on the magnitude. The high end of analyst targets sits in the $110–$115 range, which is broadly consistent with our bull case.

Risk-Adjusted Fair Value

Probability-weighting the three scenarios at 55% base / 25% bull / 20% bear produces a risk-adjusted fair value of approximately $99 per share, or 18% above the current price. Layering on the dividend yield brings total expected return on a 12-month basis into the low-20% range — strong absolute and risk-adjusted economics for a large-cap value name.

6. Risk Factors

Risk 1: Net Interest Margin Compression Becomes Structural

The single most important near-term risk is that the Q1 2026 NIM compression of 20 basis points is the beginning of a multi-quarter trend rather than a one-quarter deposit-mix shift. If competition for deposits intensifies through 2026, or if money-market alternatives continue to attract retail balances, Wells Fargo’s funding cost advantage could erode faster than asset yields can adjust. In a deep NIM compression scenario, the bank’s full-year NII guidance of approximately $50 billion would be at risk, and the loan growth tailwind would partially offset rather than amplify. The asset cap removal thesis is fundamentally about volume, but volume cannot compensate indefinitely for compressing spreads. Investors should watch the Q2 2026 NIM print very carefully — anything worse than 2.40% would be a material negative surprise, while stabilization at 2.45–2.50% would validate the thesis. The history of the U.S. banking system shows that NIM cycles tend to be persistent in both directions; getting the direction right matters more than getting the exact magnitude right.

Risk 2: Commercial Loan Demand Softens with Macro Slowdown

The 11% year-over-year loan growth posted in Q1 2026 was disproportionately driven by commercial and industrial lending. If the U.S. economy slows materially in the second half of 2026 or if tariff and trade uncertainty causes corporate capex deferrals, the loan growth tailwind could fade quickly. Wells Fargo’s outsized exposure to U.S. domestic activity is normally a strength, but in a U.S.-specific slowdown scenario it becomes a concentrated risk. The bank’s credit metrics have been remarkably clean — net charge-offs running well below normalized levels — but a deterioration in commercial credit quality would simultaneously slow loan growth and increase provision expense, a double-hit to earnings. Management has been disciplined about credit underwriting through the cycle, but the test of that discipline only comes when the cycle turns. The thesis is most exposed in a “soft landing turns into mild recession” scenario where the asset cap thaw stalls just as it was beginning to compound.

Risk 3: Regulatory or Compliance Resurgence

Wells Fargo spent seven years under significant regulatory oversight for a reason. The internal controls and risk culture have been rebuilt, and the asset cap removal was the Fed’s explicit signal of confidence in that rebuild. But the bank operates in a complex regulatory environment, and a future scandal — whether in retail sales practices, commercial lending, or wealth management — would not only damage earnings directly through fines and restitution but would also reset the regulatory clock. The market memory of the 2016–2018 period is still fresh, and any whisper of recurrence would compress the multiple immediately. This is a low-probability but high-impact risk that simply does not exist at the same magnitude at JPMorgan or US Bancorp. Investors who do not have a strong stomach for headline risk should size positions accordingly. The management team under Charlie Scharf has been the primary credibility anchor on this risk; a CEO transition without continuity of the risk-management commitment would be a meaningful negative signal.

투자 분석 이미지
Photo by Franky Magana on Unsplash

7. Conclusion and Exit Plan

Wells Fargo is one of the most interesting setups in U.S. large-cap banking heading into the second half of 2026. The Federal Reserve’s mid-2025 asset cap removal is not a one-time event to be discounted away — it is the start of a multi-year re-leverage cycle that is already producing concrete data (Q1 2026 loan book crossing $1 trillion, 11% year-over-year loan growth, 5.2% NII growth) and is reflected in management’s confidently raised 17–18% ROTCE target. The market has reacted to the Q1 2026 NIM compression by knocking nearly 15% off the share price from the 52-week high, but our reading of the deposit-cost dynamics suggests the compression is largely a lag effect rather than a structural problem. At 10.6x forward earnings and a meaningful discount to JPMorgan Chase on multiple, Wells Fargo offers a rare combination of catalyst, valuation support, and capital return for a name of its scale and quality.

Investment Rating: Buy

Entry price range: $80–$85 per share. The current price of $83.73 sits squarely in the entry zone. Investors with a longer time horizon can be comfortable initiating a position at current levels, with the option to add on any weakness toward $80 driven by short-term NIM or macro noise.

Exit conditions:

Target achieved (base case): Trim 25% of the position at $98 (consensus zone), another 25% at $108 (mid-point between base and bull case). Hold the remaining 50% as a long-term position with continued dividend and buyback compounding.
Bull case realized: If EPS power for 2027 reaches the $9.00 range and the market re-rates to 13.5x, trim aggressively at $118–$122.
Fundamental break: Exit fully if (a) two consecutive quarters of NIM below 2.40%, (b) any new significant regulatory consent order, or (c) net charge-offs exceed 0.75% of total loans on a sustained basis. Each of these conditions would invalidate a different leg of the thesis.
Time-based reassessment: Reassess fundamentals at the end of 2026 with full-year results in hand. If EPS growth, NII trajectory, and ROTCE progress are in line with the base case, extend the holding period through 2027.



ItemDetail
CompanyWells Fargo & Company (WFC)
Current Price$83.73
Target Price (Base)$102
Upside (Base)+22%
RatingBuy
Key ThesisAsset cap removal unlocks multi-year balance-sheet growth and ROTCE expansion to 17–18%, with multiple still discounted vs. JPM
Main RiskNet interest margin compression becoming structural rather than transitional

This article is for informational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice. All data sourced from public filings, analyst reports, and news as of the publication date. Invest at your own discretion.


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